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However, when one looks behind the curtain of the summit stage and examines the course of presidential preparations for such meetings, a very different picture emerges. Behind the public spectacle of diplomatic events, one finds private struggle, institutional conflict, and a policy-making process often characterized by bureaucratic opposition and partisan agenda. For the reality of the presidency today is that the power of the office is increasingly constrained, not only by the relationship between the Administration and Congress but also by the actions of agencies within the executive branch. And in those cases when congressional objectives and agencies' bureaucratic imperatives converge, the President's range of action, options for decision, and capacity to impose a desired outcome can be substantially limited.
This central paradox of presidential power, broadly gauged in precedent and public perception but often narrowly confined in practice, was a key feature of internal deliberations preceding the 1999 NATO summit. While the outcome of the summit was quite strong in policy terms, enthusiastically endorsed by President Clinton and other allied leaders, it was nonetheless a product of considerable compromise both within the Administration and with Congress. Had presidential preferences been unfettered from the outset of these preparations, the summit might well have turned out quite differently.
In particular, two key issues on the summit agenda -the future course of NATO enlargement and Alliance action on WMD proliferation -were influenced by this
phenomenon. An analytical retracing of the development of these issues in the lead-up to the summit reveals the considerable extent to which congressional sentiment and bureaucratic opposition can intersect in ways that constrain presidential prerogative.
L Powers Separated and Shared
The question of presidential power was a central concern of the framers of the constitution. Much of the constitutional convention was devoted to establishing the proper balance between the different branches of government and, in the case of the presidency, to avoiding the abuse of power experienced under the British monarchy.
Though intentionally ambiguous on many points, the final text of the Constitution makes clear the framers' intent that power would be shared between the executive and legislative branches. Indeed, coordination --and the resulting vacillation between conflict and collaboration --was made unavoidable: the President has the authority to make appointments, but Congress must confirm them; the President is empowered to negotiate treaties, but Congress must consent to their ratification; the President, as As foreign policy moved ever higher on the President's agenda in the second term, Lake's successor Sandy Berger became an increasingly visible and powerful force in driving agency deliberations. This was particularly true in the case of the NATO summit -the largest international event orchestrated by the Clinton presidency.
IlL On the Way to the Summit
The decision to convene a commemorative summit on NATO's fiftieth The key rationale behind this small and narrowly focused format was maintenance of White House control. As Chair of the meetings, the NSC was able to set the agenda, drive the pace and, most importantly, impose a presidential perspective on the deliberations. Under the guidance of the National Security Advisor, the NSC Chair was able to steer the direction of evolving policy initiatives to accommodate presidential concerns and preferences, often communicated informally during the daily national security briefings in the Oval Office. The importance -and limits -of this approach were particularly evident in the deliberations over two dominant summit issues: enlargement and new missions.
On enlargement, the NSC tasking was to develop options for next steps following the admission of the first new members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Rather than forwarding a consensus approach, the NSC specifically sought to avoid the "least common denominator" compromise solutions that were so often the result of interagency negotiation. The objective was to flesh out several viable alternatives and, in the process, to protect the President's prerogative as the ultimate decisionmaker. Without prejudging the outcome, it was assumed that the list of options would likely include the extension of invitations to additional new members, thus using the Washington summit to launch the "second round" of NATO enlargement. In terms of process, this was to be a classic "bottom-up" approach, in which options were to be developed by agencies, with the NSC functioning as a coordinator to ensure a fair consideration of opposing views.
On new missions, the NSC was to play a very different role. As the White House had already taken several high profile initiatives on the security risk posed by WMD proliferation and the vulnerability of the United States to "asymmetrical" threats, the NSC was tasked to ensure that the summit included a substantial initiative to shift NATO's strategic focus and drive greater activism in this area. The logical vehicle was the new Strategic Concept, to be released at the summit, that would articulate NATO's defining rationale and its overall approach to the evolving security challenges of the coming years. In this case, the policy process was to have more of a "top down" quality, with the NSC acting as an initiator of policy proposals and, to a large extent, as an advocate for specific outcomes.
IV. Launching Interagency Deliberations
Throughout the spring and summer of 1998, the Sherpas group worked intensively on elaboration of the summit agenda and development of corresponding policy initiatives. The intimacy of the group encouraged a collegial and cooperative process, and work proceeded rapidly. However, the emerging policy trends began to depart rather considerably from the NSC's initial taskings.
On enlargement, it quickly became clear that there was a widespread, if only loosely articulated, consensus against any further invitations at the summit. State, traditionally one of the strongest advocates of enlargement, was torn between a demonstrated commitment to continuation of the "open door" policy and a concern about the impact that a second round of invitations would have on the already tenuous situation in Russia. OSD was primarily focused on the internal cohesion of the Alliance, as well as its continued military effectiveness in light of diminished allied defense spending and the growing technology gap between U.S. and European forces. JSC felt that Alliance resources were already overtaxed and thus was strongly opposed to the assumption of any new commitments. As a result, rather than debating the question of which new members to invite, the group tended to reinforce pre-existing inclinations against any invitations.
On WMD as a new mission for NATO, the Sherpas group became a victim of the very bureaucracy that it was designed to avoid. Although the members of the group were strongly supportive of the NSC proposals (calling for a NATO WMD center to facilitate expanded intelligence-sharing on the WMD threat and to coordinate a more robust allied response to that threat), the Sherpas did not hold "lead" responsibility within their respective agencies for WMD issues. When the proper counterparts were belatedly brought into the deliberations, they strongly resisted the Sherpas' proposed approach as it held the potential to threaten current lines of bureaucratic authority. The result was repeated delay and demands to water down the proposals in order to protect agency turf.
V. Expression of Congressional Views
While Congress had no formal role in summit policy preparations, there was extensive consultation between the Administration and the Senate NATO Observer 
VI. Searching for Common Ground
As the summer of 1998 drew to an end, the Administration needed to reach closure on its policy positions so that negotiations with Allies could proceed over the fall and winter. A series of DC and PC meetings were scheduled, and the Sherpas group was tasked to refine agency positions and to assess and incorporate congressional views.
On enlargement, the outcome was obvious and unavoidable --there was no support in Congress or from any agency for invitations. As a result, the PC forwarded to the President a consensus recommendation against initiating a second round at the summit. Anticipating this outcome and aware of the President's desire to sustain momentum in the enlargement process, the National Security Advisor had earlier directed the Sherpas to develop a new initiative, dubbed the Membership Action Plan or MAP.
The MAP was intended to increase the likelihood of a future second round by strengthening the candidacies of aspiring members -thus serving to compensate for or at least counterbalance the absence of invitations. Presented with this comprehensive and uncontested recommendation, the President was in effect asked to ratify an already agreed course of action, and was not, as originally intended, allowed to choose between several alternatives.
On WMD, there was room for greater albeit still limited flexibility. On the one hand, agencies' "institutional" opposition to a robust initiative had been bolstered by congressional anxiety about global missions. On the other hand, there were none, either within the Administration or on Capital Hill, prepared to advocate that NATO ignore the very real threat posed by WMD proliferation. As a result, the Sherpas (at the prodding of the NSC) were able to reach a negotiated compromise on a streamlined version of the original initiative, justified with the rationale that Congress would perceive it as stopping far short of a global mandate. In an effort to preserve the delicate balance of this compromise, the PC again forwarded a consensus recommendation to the Presidentneither offering options nor meeting the original benchmark of a substantial shift in NATO's strategic focus.
VII. Beyond the Summit
Despite reported disappointment with the conservative nature of the PC recommendations, the President's official response was already foreordained. Lacking graduated options to differentiate between competing priorities, his range of action was essentially restricted to approving or rejecting the proposals wholesale. And given the virtually monolithic consensus among his senior advisors, reinforced by similar or at least compatible congressional sentiment, there was little to be gained --and much political currency as well as policy coherence to be risked --by an outright rejection.
From the narrow perspective of assessing the summit results, this process of policy development was largely successful. The caution and compromise reflected in the American proposals ensured a gradual, evolutionary approach to these very sensitive issues. This approach was well received by most allies, who are consistently more comfortable with the status quo, and thus facilitated smooth adoption of the U.S.
initiatives without prolonged debate or public controversy.
From a broader perspective, however, the course of summit preparations reveals the extent to which the on-going evolution of the presidency continues in the direction of tighter constraints and a diminished capacity for unilateral action. The era of imperial prerogative over foreign policy is long past, with both Congress and cabinet agencies playing increasingly crucial roles that compete with and sometimes even contradict presidential priorities. As the executive-legislative relationship on foreign policy issues evolves back toward the framers' intended "invitation to struggle," the imperative for consultation and genuine collaboration will be ignored only at great cost. And as interagency deliberations within the executive branch are likely to grow more elaborate and fractious as international issues become increasingly complex, future incumbents of the White House will have little choice but to abandon magisterial presumptions in pursuit of more mundane managerial concerns. To achieve their "own" agendas for administration performance, presidents must involve themselves and their staffs in driving policy development from the very outset of the deliberative process, and thus acknowledge that decision by fiat is simply not viable. For the "myth of the big-time presidency, in which one 'rules' as a successor to George Washington and Franklin
Roosevelt"' 7 --however useful it may be in projecting the "theater of power"'1 8 that surrounds the White House --is a stark contrast to the contemporary realities of the office. 
